Proof-of-work makes block proposal expensive by burning electricity. Could the same expensive-to-win, cheap-to-verify race be run without a single watt of wasted computation — just money already staked in the system?
Round 1's leader: D — a validator with 10% selection probability.
Slide the round number and watch a different validator win each time. There's no computation to race — just a deterministic lottery where each validator's ticket size is exactly its stake. A's 40-stake ticket wins 4 times as often as D's 10-stake ticket, on average.
- Lay every validator's stake out on a line
Validators A, B, C, D hold stakes 40, 30, 20, 10 (total 100). Laid end to end on :
- A occupies
- B occupies
- C occupies
- D occupies
- Hash the round number into a ticket on that line
— a pseudo-random position, uniform over , standing in for a real chain's verifiable random function (VRF).
- Whoever's range the ticket lands in proposes the block
Because each validator's slice of the line is exactly proportional to its stake, the probability validator is selected is — no computation race, just weighted chance.
- Nothing-at-stake: voting costs nothing without a penalty
In proof-of-work, hash power spent mining one fork can't also be spent mining a competing fork — it's a physical resource. Stake isn't consumed by voting, so without a rule against it, a validator can support every competing fork at once for free. Slashing closes this gap: forfeit your entire stake if you're caught supporting more than one fork.
- stake(v) — validator 's stake; determines both its slice of the line and its slashing exposure.
- ticket — the round's hashed lottery draw, uniform over .
No rounds run yet.
Run rounds one at a time and watch the tally bars grow. Over many rounds, D (10% of stake) wins roughly a tenth as often as A (40% of stake) — the same proportional guarantee as the formula, just visible as frequency instead of probability.
Six rounds, validators A(40) B(30) C(20) D(10), stake ranges A:[0,40) B:[40,70) C:[70,90) D:[90,100).
- Round 1
, so . That falls in D's range — D wins, despite holding only 10% of the stake.
- Round 2
, inside B's — B wins.
- Rounds 3–6
- Round 3: , falls in A's → A
- Round 4: , falls in C's → C
- Round 5: , falls exactly at B's lower bound → B
- Round 6: , falls in A's → A
- Six rounds: D, B, A, C, B, A
- A: 2 wins (stake 40%)
- B: 2 wins (stake 30%)
- C: 1 win (stake 20%)
- D: 1 win (stake 10%)
A small sample, but already leaning the way the stakes predict.
Validator D holds only 10% of the stake, so it should win roughly 1 in 10 rounds. Slide to a round number (1–30) whose leader is D.
Proof-of-stake replaces "spend energy to win the right to propose" with "risk capital to win the right to propose" — cheaper for the planet, but it opens a new failure mode that proof-of-work structurally can't have: voting for every fork at once costs nothing unless slashing makes it costly. The next chapter looks at what happens when forks appear at all, under either consensus rule.